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Abatract
In this paper we study the notion of refinement of solutions to a linear
complementazity problem analogous to such a notion in the theory of
noncooperative games. We give sutficient conditions under whích these
refinements exist. In particular we show that if the underlying matrix
of the linear complementarity problem is a 2 x 2 P-matrix, the unique
solution to it must be a proper solution. The concept of pertectness is
much weaker. We prove that if the underlying matrix is a Q-matrix the
problem has at least one períect solution although not all solutions to it
may be perfect. The notion of weak properness is between perfectness and
properness and e~tistence of such a solution is guaranteed if the underlying
matrix is a P-matrix. We also show that if the underlying matrix of the
linear complementazity problem is induced by a bimatrix game as in the
formulation similar to the one given by Miller and Zucker for finding an
equlibrium of a polymatrix game, at least one of its solutions must be
proper corresponding to a proper Naah equilibrium for the game itself. In
general this matrix is not a P-matrix.
Key worda. Linear complementarity problem, perfectness, properness, weak proper-
ness, P-matrices, Q-matrices.1 Introduction
The notion of a Nash equilibrium point as a solution concept in noncooperative
game theory has been refined in various ways mainly to eliminate certain un-
desirable properties of a Nash equilibrium. Selten ( [8]) introduced the concept
of a perfect equilibrium while Myerson ( [5]) developed the stronger notion of a
proper equilibrium. The concept of a weakly proper equilibrium also has been
introduced, see [9].
Since the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium point for a bimatrix game
(see Lemke and Howson [3]) and for a polymatrix game (see Howson [2]) have
been formulated as linear complementarity problems, one question that naturally
arises is whether the notion of a perfect or proper equilibrium can be reformulated
to refine the solution of a linear complementarity problem. The refinement for
properness has already been introduced for stationary points of continuous maps
over polytopes. If f: S-~ R" where S is a polytope in R", the existence of a
robust stationary point and its computation have been studied by van der Laan.
Talman and Yang [10], where robust stationarity is the refinement for properness
of stationarity. Note that given a square matrix M of order n, and a vector
q E R", since a stationary point of the map j: R~ -~ R" where f(x) - Mx -~ q,
is a solution to the linear complementarity problem GCP(q, M), refinement of
solutions to LCP for properness generalizes also the notion of robust stationarity
to maps defined on unbounded polyhedral sets. 5uch refinements have not yet
been considered.
In this paper we study the notions of perfect, proper and weakly proper solu-
tions for a linear complementazity problem. We present some sufficient conditions
for various refinements to exist. In particular we show that if the matrix M is a
2 x 2 P-matrix, the unique solution to the LCP(q, M) is a proper solution. This
result is presented in Section 4. A weaker concept is the concept of perfectness
3which we define in Section 3. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for
the LCP(q, M) to have a perfect solution. Further, we show that if the matrix
M is a Q-matrix, then for each q E R". the LCP(q, M) has a perfect solution,
although every solution to it may not be perfect. These results are presented in
Section 3. The notion of weak properness is between perfectness and properness.
This notion is also studied in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5 we show that the
LCP(q, M) arising from the Miller-Zucker [4] type formulation of the problem of
finding a Nash equilibrium point of a given bimatrix game always has a proper
solution corresponding to a proper equilibrium point of the game. It may be
noted that this matrix is not a P-matrix.
2 Mathemetical Preliminaries
Let R" denote the n-dimensional Euclidean space over the reals and let A be a
matrix of order m x n containing m rows and n columns. We use the notation
A.~ to denote the jth column of A, for j - 1, 2, ..., n and A;., to denote the ith
row of A, for i - 1, 2, ..., m. In particular we consider matrices of order n x n,
also called square matrices. Let M be a square matrix of order n. For J and
K, being nonempty subsets of the set {1,2,...,n}, the symbol M~K is used to
denote the submatrix of M containing only those rows and columns of M whose
indices are in the sets J and K, respectiively, arranged in their natural order.
In particular, the symbol M~J denotes the principal submatrix of M containing
only those rows and columns whose indices are in the set J. Given a matrix A,
the set of all nonnegative linear combinations of the columns of A is denoted by
Pos(A). Note that this set is a polyhedral convex cone.
Given a square matrix M of order n, the linear complementarity problem is




where w' is the transpose of the vector w. This problem is denoted as LCP(q, M).
The class of all square matrices M of order n for which the LCP(q, M) has
a solution for each q E R" is called a Q-matrix. A square matrix M all of whose
principal minors are positive is called a P-matrix. A matrix M all of whose
principal minors are nonzero is called a nondegenerate matrix. Note that a P-
matrix is a nondegenerate matrix. A Q-matrix need not be nondegenerate. A
well known theorem in linear complementarity theory states that for a square
matrix M, the LCP(q, iLl} has a uniyue ~~lutioii for each q E It" if and only if
it is a P-matrix. See [1~.
Suppose (w, z) is a solution to LCP(q, M). Let C be an n x n submatrix of
(I, -M) containing for each j either L~ or -M.~, such that it contains the columns
!,~ of I corresponding to w~ ~ 0 and the columns -M.~ of -M corresponding to
z~ ~ 0. Such a matrix is called a complementary matríx induced 6y the solution
(w, z). The cone generated by a complementary matrix is called a complementary
cone. A complementary matrix or cone induced by a solution (w,i) need not be
unique.
Let M be a given square matrix of order n. We say that M is a copositive
matrix if x`Mx ~ 0. `dx ? 0. A copositive matrix M is called copositéve plus if
x`Mx - 0,x 1 0~ (M } M`)x - 0. A square matrix M is called a Qo-matrex
if LCP(q, M) has a solution for each q E Pos((1, -M)) or, equivalently, if the
union of all complementary cones of (I, -M) is convex. We also note here that
if M is a Q-matrix, then the union of all nondegenerate complementary cones of
(I, -M) covers R".
53 Perfectness
Associated with a given LCP(q, M) we consider the following perturbed proble,m
P(E), where E~ 0 is a given vector in R". The perturbed problem is: Find
(iii(E),z(E)) such that
tv(E) - Mi(E) - q f ME
(w(E), z(E)) 1 0
w(E)~i(E) - 0.
Definition 3.1 Let (w, z) be a solution to the LCP(q, M). Then (w, i) is a
perfect solution to the LCP(q, M) if there exists a sequence {Eh,h - 1,2,...}
with Eh E R", E~ 1 0, Eh -~ 0 as h-~ oo and a solution (w(E"),z(Eh)) to the
perturbed problem P(Eh) jor each h- 1,2,... such that as h--~ oo, z(E") --~ z.
Note that the problem P(E) is equivalent to the following problem: Find
(w'(E),z"(E)) satisfying
w'(E) - Mz'(E) - 9
Z'(E) ~ E, w'(E) i Q
w~ (E) i 0 ~ Z~ (E) - Ei.
We may call the latter problem the E-complementarity problem associated with
the LCP(q, M). We note that for the perfectness of a Nash equilibrium in a
noncooperative game, the definition given by Selten [8) also requires that the
sequence of optimal solutions to a perturbed problem converges to the given
equilibrium.
The following example shows that there may be matrices M and vectors q
such that no solution to LCP(q, M) is perfect.
6-1 -1
EXAMPLE 3.1 Get M- . This is a matrix all of whose entries are
-1 -2
f 0
negative. Let q- I . Note that GCP(q, M) has the unique solution (w. z) -
LO
(0, 0). This solution is not perfect since for any E ) 0, E E R2, LCP(q f ME, M)
does not have a solution.
Let Post(M) denote the cone {b~b - My, for some y E R", y~ 0}. In case M
is nonsingular. Posf(M) is an open cone. We now have the following theorem.
Txr;vn~M 3.i The LCP(q,M) has a perfect solution if and only if there exists
a complementary cone Pos(C) containing q such that
({q} f Post(M)) fl Pos(C) ~ 0.
Proof: First suppose that there is a complementary cone Pos(C) associated
with (I,-M) and containing the vector q such that
({q} ~- Post(M)) n Pos(C) ~ 0.
Since q E Pos(C) there exists a Q E R", Q? 0, such that
q-Cp.
Further there exists an E E R", E~ 0, such that q f ME E Pos(C). Hence there
exists an a E R", a~ 0, such that
qfME-Ca.
Multiplying (3.1) by 1 - a and (3.2) by .1 we obtain for any a E(0, 1)
q t MaE - C((1 - a)Q f aa).
7Taking ~- k and Ek - k, we obtain
q t MEk - CI(1 - k)A f k], k- 2, 3, ....
Note that it is now easy to construct a solution (wk, zk) to the perturbed problem
LCP(q -~ MEk, M) that corresponds to the complementary matrix C and as
k-~ oo this solution sequence {(wk, zk)} converges to (w, á) where (w, z) is a
solution to LCP(q, M) that induces the complementary cone Pos(C). Thus we
have a perfect solution to LCP(q, M).
Conversely suppose LCP(q, M) has a perfect solution (w, z). By definition
there exists a sequ~nce {E"}, E" E R", E" ~ 0 b' h- 1, 2, ..., Eh -~ 0 as h-~ oo,
and a corresponding sequence of solutions {(w(Eh), i(Eh)} to LCP(q ~- MEh, M)
such that w(Eh) --~ w and i(Eh) ~ z as h-~ oo. Let Pos(Ch) be a complementary
cone induced by the solution (tu(Eh),i(Eh)). This cone contains q f MEh. Since
there are only finitely many (2") complementary cones, it follows that there
is a subsequence {Eh~} of {Eh} such that q f MEh~ E Pos(C), d v, for some
complementary cone C. By the closure property of complementary cones and
by the fact that {zv(Eh~),z(Eh~)} -~ (w,i) it follows that q E Pos(C). Thus
({q} f Post(M)) fl Pos(C) ~ 0 and q E Pos(C). This concludes the proof of
the theorem. ~
CoRO[.LnRY 3.1 Civen an LCP(q, M), suppose q is contained in the interior of
a nondegenerate complementary cone Pos(C) of (1, -M). Then there is a perfect
solution to LCP(q, M).
Proof: If q E int(Pos(C)), it follows that there exists a ó~ 0 such that
q f ME E int(Pos(C)) d E 1 O,E E R" with ~~ E ~~G ó.
8Thus it follows that
({q} } Post(M)) fl Pos(C) ~ 0.
The next theorem shows that if M is a Q-matrix and q E R" then the
LCP(q, M) has a perfect solution.
THEOREM 3.2 Get M 6e a Q-matrix. Then given any q E R", there is a perfect
solution to LCP(q, M).
Proof: Since M is a Q- matrix, for any q E R" and E E R", E 1 0, LCP(q f ME, M)
has a solution. Take any sequence {Eh},En E R",Eh ~ 0 V h- 1,2..., such that
Eh ~ 0 as h -ti oo. Let Pos(Ch) be a complementary cone induced by a solu-
tion to LCP(q f MEh, M). Since there are only finitely many complementary
cones of (I,-M), it follows that there is a subsequence {E~~} of {Eh} such that
Pos(Ch~) - Pos(C), d v, for some complementary cone C of (I,-M). By a
result of Murty ( Exercise 3.85 in (6]) we can assume without loss of general-
ity that int(Pos(C)) ~~l. Thus for each Eh~ there exists a(3s~ ? 0 satisfying
q f MEh~ - CQh~. Since C is nonsingular it follows that as h„ ~ oo, Qh~ ~ Q for
some p~ 0, and hence q E Pos(C). This concludes the proof. ~
Since a P-matrix is a Q-matrix we have the following corollary.
COROLLARY 3.2 Get M 6e a P-matrix. The unique soJution to LCP(q, M), for
any q E R", fs perfect.
The following theorem presents two other equivalent formulations for the notion
of perfectness of a solution to the LCP. In what follows let e denote the n-
dimensional vector of ones.
9THEOREM 3.3 Let the LCP(q, M) 6e given. The jollowing assertions are equiv-
alent: (iJ (w,i) is a perfect solution for LCP(q,M);
(ii~ z is a limit point of a sequence of positive vectors {z(a)} for positive real
numbers a going to zero where, with w(a) - q f Mz(a), w(a) ~ 0, w;(a) ~ 0~
z;(a) C a, for all i- 1,2...n;
(iiiJ i is a limtit point of a sequence of positive vectors {z(a)} jor positáve real
numóers a going to zem, where, with w(a) - q f Mz(a), w(a) ~ 0 and z`w(a) -
0.
Proof:. (i) ~(ii): There exists a sequence {Eh}, Eh E R", Eh 1 0, Eh ~ 0 as
h ~ oo, and a sequence {i(Eh)} such that with iÓ(Eh) - Q-} MEh ~- M2(Eh),
we have z(Eh) ~ O,w(Eh) ~ 0, w(Eh)`z(Eti) - 0 and {z(Eh)} -~ z. Now take
ati - maxl~; ~„[E;']. Also take z(ah) - i(Eti) f Eh ~ 0. This sequence satisfies all
the conditions of (ii).
(ii) ~(iii): Suppose (ii) holds. Then there is a sequence {z(a)} with limit z as
a-~ 0 such that, z(a) ~ O,w(a) - q t Mz(a) ~ 0 and w;(a) ~ 0~ z;(a) C a.
Let uw - lima,~o w(a) - lima~o[q f Mz(a)] - q-F Mi. If w; ~ 0, then w;(a) ~ 0
for all sufliciently small a and hence z;(a) C a for all sufficiently small a. This
implies that i; - 0. Thus we can obtain a subsequence of {z(a)} that satisfies
the requirement of (iii).
(iii)~ (i): Given a sequence {z(a)} as in (iii) define the sequence of vectors
{E(a)}Q~o in R" as follows:
Ei(a) -
z;(a) if á; - 0
a IfZ;iO.
Define the vector z(E(a)) by i(E(a)) - z(a)-E(a). Note that as a-~ 0, E(a) ~
0, and that for a sufficiently small z(E(a)) is nonnegative. Further {z(E(a))}
tends to i. Note also that by the complementarity condition of (iii) it is easy to
10verify that with
w(a) - 4 f Mz(a) - 4 t M(z(E(a)) -~ E(a)),
(w(a), i(e(a))) solves the LCP(q f Me(a), M), for a sequence of vectors e(a)
going to zero. Thus (i) follows. This completes the proof of the theorem. ~
The next example shows that Theorem 3.2 does not hold for the class of
copositive plus matrices.
ExnMPLE 3.2 Let M- I 0 1 J
andq-( 0 1. Then (w, z) with z -(0, a)`
l 1 0 `0 J
and eu - ( a, 0)t is a solution to LCP(q, M), for each a~ 0, none of them being
perfect, whereas M is a copositáve plus matrix.
REMARK 3.1 The notion of perfectness of solution to a linear complementarity
problem is also related to the weak upper Lípchitzian property of the solution map.
It is known that given an LCP(q,M) if S(q) denotes the set of solutions to the
GCP(q, M) then
S(q) C S(4) f c~~9 - 4~~g
where c is a positive real constant and !3 denotes the unit ball of radtius 1 in R".
This holds for all q in R". See (1~ for a proof. In particular if M is a Q-matria
this implies that for any q E R" there is a perfect solution.
4 Properness
In this section we develop the concept of properness of a solution to a linear
complementarity problem. Properness is a much stronger refinement of solutions
than perfectness as defined in the previous section. We also introduce weak
properness being a weaker concept than properness but stronger than perfectness.
11We discuss some classes of LCPs satisfying the condition that for every q there
is a proper or weakly proper solution.
Properness of a solution to an LCP is motivated by a strategy being a proper
Nash equilibrium in a noncooperative game. See Myerson [5].
To define properness we introduce the concept of an a-proper solution to a
linear complementarity problem for some positive number a.
Definition 4.1 Let the LCP(q, M) be given. Then fora ~ 0, a E R, (z(a), w(a))
is an a- proper solution to LCP(q, M) if (i) z;(a) ~ 0 t1 i- 1, 2, ... n, (ii)
w(a) - 9-~ Mz(a) ~ 0, (iiiJ w;(a) ~ 0~ z;(a) C a, (iv) w;(a) c w~(a) ~
z,(cti) G az~(a).
Definition 4.2 Let the LCP(q, M) be given and let (w, z) 6e a solution to
it. Then (w, i) is a proper solution to LCP(q, M) ij there exists a sequence
{ah},an E R,an 1 0, and a sequence {(z(ah),w(ah))} of ah- proper solutáons
to LCP(q, M) such that (i) limh~~ah - 0 and (iiJ limh-.~z(ah) - z.
THEOREM 4.1 Let (w, z) be a solution to LCP(q, M). Then ( w, z) is a proper
solution if the following conditions hold:
(iJ The solution (w, i) is nondegenemte; (iiJ The complementary matrix C in-
duced by the solution is nonsingular; (iiiJ The postitive coordinates oj w are dis-
tinct (i.e., w; ~ 0~ vw; ~ w~ for any i~ j).
Proof. Let (w, z) be a solution to the LCP(q, M) satisfying (i), (ii) and (iii).
Now we construct a sequence (w(a), z(a)) of a-proper solutions for sufficiently
small a as follows. Let (rr(1), ~r(2), ..., a(n)) be a permutation of the elements
of the set { 1, 2, ..., n} such that
wx~;l - 0, f or
12where 1 G 2 G n is the number of zero coordinates of w, and




zx(~)(a) - (C-r(9 t ~ M.n(i)~))x(~)~ for
i-eti
zx(;)(a) - a` for i - 2 f 1, 2 f 2, ... , n.
For sufficiently small a it is clear that zi(a) ~ 0, d j - 1, 2, ... n, and
w(a) - q f Mz(a) 1 0. Also note that w„(;~(a) - 0, á- 1,2...P,z;(a) G a if
w;(a) ~ 0, and that
w;(a) G wi(a) ~ zi(a) G az;(a).
Therefore (w(a), z(a)) is a-proper for small enough a. Moreover z(a) converges
to z as a-~ 0, since the matrix C is nonsingular. ~
In our next theorem we show that the unique solution to an LCP(q, M) when
the matrix M is a 2 x 2 P-matrix is a proper solution. At present we do not
have a proof to show that a general P-matrix induces a proper solution.
THEOREM 4.2 Let LCP(q, M) 6e given. Suppose M is a 2 x 2 P-matráa. Then
the unáque solution ( w, z) to the LCP(q, M) is proper.
Proof: In case wl ~ w2 and (w, z) is a nondegenerate solution, the result follows
from Theorem 4.1. Suppose now that wl ~ wZ and (w,z) is a degenerate solution.
Without loss of generality, assume that wl ~ 0. This implies that w2 - 0; i~ -
z2 - 0. Choose z(a) -(a2,a)t and let w(a) - q.} Mz(a). Then
wl(a) - 91 f- mlia2 f m~za and w2(a) - 42 ~- mna~ f m2aa.
13Since mZZ ~ 0, for suf~iciently small a we have that wt(a) ~ w2(a) 1 0,
x~(a) c az2(a) and z2(a) G a. Hence (w(a),z(a)) is an a-proper solution for a
sufficiently small. Clearly, {z(a)} converges to z as a goes to zero.
Next suppose that w~ - wz ~ 0. In this case i - 0 and q- (c, c)` for some
real number c~ 0. Let z(E) -(El, EZ) for any E-(El, Ez) ~ 0. We have
w1ÍE) - c f miiEl -} misEs
w2(E) - c f mxiEi i- mssES.
If ma~ G ml~ and mlz c m~2 or if m21 ~ ml~ and mlz 1 mz2, then choose E~ and
EZ such that
Es - (mii - m2i)Eillmzs - miz).
For suf~iciently small El we have w1(E) - w~(E) 7 0, and therefore (w(E),z(E)) is
an a-proper solution with a- max{El, Ez} when suíficiently small. If mz~ C m~l
and m12 ~ m2a then choose z~(a) - a' and zz(a) - a. Note that
w~(a) - c f m~la~ -h m~za and wx(a) - c-~ mz1a2 ~ m~za.
For sufficiently small a we have wt(a) ~ wz(a) ~ 0 and therefore ( w(a), z(a))
is an a-proper solution. If m21 ~ mll and mlz c m~~, choose z~(a) - a and
zz(a) - a2. Then for sufficiently small a we have again that (w(a),z(a)) is an
a-proper solution.
Finally suppose that wt - wz - 0. Without loss of generality assume that
iz - 0. If i~ ~ 0, we have q-(-ml~z~,-m~lzl)'. Let us consider the se-
quence {z(a)} where zZ(a) - a and z~(a) is such that w~(a) - 0. Since
wt(a) - mll(-il ~ zl(a)) f ml~a it follows that z~(a) - zr -~. Then we
get
wa(a) -
a(miim2s - mism2i) ) 0
mti
14as a~ 0 and M is a P-matrix. Hence (w(a),z(a)) is an a-proper solution for
sufficiently small a and z(a) converges to z as a goes to zero. If zl - 0 we have
q-(0,0)`. Let z(e) -(e~,ez) for any c-(el,cz). Then
wi(E) - miiEi f mizEz
wz(E) - mziEi ~- mzzEZ.




For sufficiently small e~ we have that wl(e) 1 wz(e) ~ 0 and therefore (w(e), z(e))
is an a-proper solution with a- e~. The case mz~ ? m~~ and m~z ~ mzz cannot
arise because M is a P-matrix. If mzl G mt~ and mlz ~ mzz then choose el - az
and ez - a, so that (w(e), z(e)) is an a-proper solution for a sufficiently small. If
mz~ 1 m~l and m~z G mzz, but M,~ ~ M.z, then choose el - a and ez - az, so
that (w(e),z(e)) is an a-proper solution for a sufficiently small. This concludes
the proof. ~
Condition (ii) of properness seems to be too strong a requirement in case
eu; - w~ ~ 0 for some indices i and j. To relax this condition we introduce a
weaker concept, to be called weak properness. See Van Damme [9].
Definition 4.3 A solution ( w, i) to a given LCP(q, M) ís weakly proper éJ there
exists n sequence {z(ah)} Jor some sequence {ah}, ati E R, ah 1 0, H h such that
(ii z(an) ~ 0 `d h and limhyeoz(an) - z:
(ii) i`w(ah) - 0 where w(ah) - q f Mz(ati) ? 0 b h;
(iii) tu; G fv~ ~ z~(ah) G ahz;(ah) b' h.
The next theorem relates the various refinements introduced.
15THEOREM 4.3 Every proper solutíon to a gíven GCP(q, M) is weakly properand
every weakly proper solution to át is perfect.
Proof: Suppose (uw, z) is a proper solution to LCP(q, M). Then there exists a
sequence {z(ah)} with z(ah) ~ 0 such that limahyoz(ati) - i,
w(an) - 9 f Mz(an) ? 0, w~(ah) 1 0~ z~(ah) C an, and wt(ah) C wi(an) ~
z~(an) c ahz;(ah), d h 1 0. Suppose now that there is a subsequence {ah„}
of {ah} such that w;(ah„) ~ 0 H v. Then it follows that z;(ah„) G ah,,, b' v,
and hence that z; - limeh-,oz;(ah) - 0. So for h sufficiently large it holds that
i`w(ah) - 0. Thus it follows that the solution (vi,z) is weakly proper.
Suppose now (iu, z) is a weakly proper solution to LCP(q, M). It follows that
there is a sequence {z(ah)} with z(ati) ~ 0 such that limahyoz(an) - z~ w(ah) -
q f Mz(ah) ~ 0, w; G wá ~ z~(an) C ahz;(an), and z`w(ah) - 0`d h ~ 0. It
follows now, that if w;(ah) 1 0 then z; - 0 and hence z;(ah) -~ 0. Thus we
can find a sequence Bh going to zero such that z;(ah) C Bh, if w;(ah) ~ 0. Thus
(w(ah), z(an)) is a Bh-perfect solution converging to (w, z). It follows that (w, z)
is a perfect solution. ~
As in the case of perfectness of a solution, weak properness can be character-
ized in terms of the nonempty intersection of two cones. From this characteri-
zation also it follows immediately that weak properness implies perfectness. Let
(w, i) be a solution to LCP(q, M). Then define the cone Pos(M, w) by
Pos(M,w)-{yER"~y-Mz,z~O,vw;Cw~~z~Gaz;di,jfora~0}
and let E be the ~natrix, of which the columns are 1.~ for j such that z~ - 0.
THEOREM 4.4 Let (w, z) 6e a solution to LCP(q, M) and let Pos(M, w) and
the matrix E be as defined above. Then (w, z) is a weakly pmper solution to
16LCP(q, M) ij and onty iJ
({q} f Pos(M,v~)) n Pos(E) ~ 0.
Proof: Suppose ( ui, i) is a weakly proper solution to LCP(q, M). Then there
exists a sequence {z(a)} with a tending to 0 and z(a) ~ i such that w(a) -
g f Mz(a) ~ 0, z`w(a) - 0, and w; G w~ ~ z~(a) G az;(a). For any a~ 0 we
have that w(a) E ({q} f Pos(M, w)) fl Pos(E).
Now suppose that ( {q} ~ Pos(M, w)) fl Pos(E) ~ 0 and let w' be a point in
this cone. Then there exists a real number ~ 1 0 such that
w~ - 9 f Mz(aT )
for some z(a') for which w; G w~ ~ z~(a') G cz z;(a'),z;(a') 1 0 `d i, and
z`w' - 0, because w' E Pos(E). For 0 G a G 1, take z(a) - (1 - a)z -f az(a').
Clearly, z(a) 1 0!1 a, 0 G a G 1, w; G w~ ~ z~(a) G az;(a), and w(a) -
q~- Mz(a) 1 0. Further, i`w(a) - 0 b'a, 0 G a G 1, and z(a) ~ i. This
concludes the proof. ~
In case M is a P-matrix, the solution to LCP(q, M) is weakly proper.
THEOREM 4.5 Get the LCP(q, M) 6e given. !J the matrix M is a P-matrix then
the unique solution to GCP(q, M) is weakly proper.
Proof: Let (w, á) be the unique solution to LCP(q, M). Let
L - {I E {1,2,...n}~z~ ~ 0}
and J-{ j E { 1, 2, ..., n}~w~ - i~ - 0}. From the proof of Theorem 4.1 and
Theorem 4.3 it follows that (w, z) is weakly proper if J- 0. Suppose therefore
that J ~ 0. Since M is a P-matrix, the matrix Mrr - MrLMLiMLr is also a
P-matrix. Hence there exists a vector d E R~r~, d~ 0, such that
(Mrr - MrtMiiMcr)d ~ 0.
17Now we construct a sequence {z(a)}o~o by choosing z~(a) - ad. For the coordi-
nates of zj(a) we proceed as follows. First we arrange the elements of G U J in in-
creasing order of the coordinates of - vi. Let n(L U J) - (a(1), ~r(2), ... a(~L U J~))
be such an order. Then we define z„~kl(a) - ak, f or k- 1, 2, .. . ~L U J~. Finally,
for L we define zL(a) --Mii(qL f MLLzL(a)). Clearly, z(a) 1 0 for sufficiently
small a 1 0. Moreover z~(a) converges to 0 for j E L and zL(a) converges to
zL if a goes to 0. Hence limalo z(a) - i.
Next we show that w(a) - q f Mz(a) 1 0 and z`w(a) - 0 for sufficiently
small a. For the set L we obtain
wL(a) - 9L f MLLZL(a) t MLLZLIa),
so wL(a) - 9L f MLL(-Mu(qL f MLLzL(a))) f MLLzL(a) - 0. For suffi-
ciently small a we also have that vrL~~(a) 1 0 because -uy ~ 0. To prove
that w~(a) ~ 0, note that
wJ(a) -(qJ - MJLMLL9L) ~(MJJMJLMLLMLJ)(ad) f terril3 Of O(a2).
The first term is w~ and therefore equal to 0. The second term is strictly positive
by the choice of d and dominates the third term which only contains terms of
order higher than or equal to a2, for sufficiently small a. Thereïore for small
enough a we have w~(a) ~ 0. Moreover, since wL(a) - 0 for all a and iL - 0 we
also have z`w(a) - 0 for any a. This concludes the proof that (w, z) is a weakly
proper solution to LCP(q, M). ~
5 The bimatrix case
In this section we consider the LCP arising from the problem of computing a Nash
equilibrium for a bimatrix game. A bimatrix game is specified by (nl, n2, A, B)
where nl is the number of actions available to Player 1 and n2 is the number of
18actions available to Player 2. The n~ x nz matrix A(B) is the pay-off matrix for
Player 1(Player 2) i.e., a;~ (b;~) is the payoff for Player 1(Player 2) if Player 1
chooses his i-th action and Player 2 chooses his j-th action. See Van Damme (9].
Let Sl -{x E R"' ~x ? 0, ~;'~ x; - 1}. Any x E S~ is called a mixed strategy
for Player 1. Similarly let S2 - {x E R"' ~x ~ 0, ~,"'1 x; - 1} be the set of mixed
strategies for Player 2. We say that (x', y') is a Nash equilibrium strategy for the
bimatrix game (n~, n2, A, B) if x' E S', y' E S2, (x')`Ay' 1 x'Ay' b' x E S',
and (x')'By' 1(x')`By `d y E S2. The problem of finding a Nash equilibrium
strategy and the corresponding equilibrium payoffs has been formulated as a
linear complementarity problem by Lemke and Howson. See [3]. There have also
been other formulations of this problem as a linear complementarity problem. In
what follows we shall use the following formulation which is similar to the one
presented by Miller and Zucker [4]. We have the following result.
LF.MMA 5.1 Given a óimatrix game (n~, n2, A, B) with A 1 0, B) 0, (x', y') is
a Nash equilibrium with equilibrium pay-offs (ii -(x')`Ay' and (j~ -(x')`By' if
and only if (x', y', Qi f 1, Q~ f 1) is a solution to the LCP(q, M) with
M- ,4-
where Et is a n~ x n~ matrix whose entries are all equa! to 1 and Ez is a matrix
oj order n2 x nz whose entries are all equal to 1.
THEOREM 5.1 The LCP(q, M) as introduced in Theorem 5.1 induced by a bi-
matrix game (nl, nz, A, B) has a proper solution which yields a proper Nash equi-
librium to that game.
19Proof: Let k- n~ ~- nz. Let a be a real number such that 0 G a G 1. Let
e E Rk be defined by taking its ith coordinate as E; - ak, l G i C k.
ul
Let S(a) - {u E Rk~u - ,u' E St,uz E Sz,u ~ e}. Note that S(a) uz -
is a nonempty compact convex subset of Rk. Define a point to set function F on
( u'
S(a) as follows: Given u- I E S(a), let
` uz
Qi - m,inrt;~n~[1 f (Auz);] (5.1)
Ll - {i~,Ci~ - 1 .}- (Auz);} (5.2)
and let
Rz - rnznl~~c,,,[1 } (B`u')~] (5.3)
Lz - {i~~iz - 1 f (B`ul);}. (5.4)
u
Let ~ E Rk}z be defined as the vector Ql . Note that w(~) - q f M~ ? 0.
Qz
Further notethat theset L-{i~w;(~) - 0} equals LtU({nt}fLz)U{kfl,kf2}.
The image set F(u) is defined as
{z E S(a)~w;(~) ~ 0~ z; G a, w;(~) G wi(~) ~ z~ G az;, 1 C i, j G k}.
Note that this is a convex and compact subset of S(a). To show that the set is
nonempty for all a sufficiently small, we note that the point z' defined as follows
is contained in F(u). For any i, I G i C k, first let
r; -~{j~w~(~) C w;(~), 1 C j C k}. Then let
(z''); - a'~ if r; 1 1, 1 C i C nl (5.5)
~-L~gL1 ~s" )J - ~1~ 1 if i E Ll (5.6)
(z"z); - a'~~t~ if r,,,t; 1 1,1 G i C nz (5.7)
- 1-~'a`'l~~'1' if i E Lz. (5.8) - !k(Lz)
20Now take z' - I ,~ J
. Note that z' E S(a) for all a suf6ciently small and
`.z
that w;(~) 1 0~ z; c a. For 1 G i,j C k if w~(~) C w;(~), then note that
i~ L and that r~ G r;. Hence it follows that z; c az~. Thus z' E F(u). We now
claim that the map F is a closed map. To see this, suppose we have a sequence
{u"}, where u" E S(a) which converges to some u E S(a). Also suppose that
z" E F(u") and the sequence {z"} converges to some z. Given u", let (ii and (iz
be defined as in (5.1) and (5.3), respectively. It is clear that ~ converges to Q~
where
and ~ converges to
z
Ql - mini~;~",[1 f (Au );]
e
Qz - mini~;~",[1 ~- (B ut);].
un u
Let ~" be defined as ~ . Note that ~- fim„y~~" is given by Qr
pZ ?z
Suppose now w;(~) G w~(~). It follows that for all n sufficiently large,
w;(~") G w~(~"). Hence it follows that z~ C az" and hence á~ C az;. Similarly
it is easy to verify that w;(t;) 1 0~ z; C a. Thus z E F(u) and hence F
is closed. We now appeal to Kakutani's fixed point theorem (see p.67 in [7])
to conclude that there ís a v(a) E S(a) such that v(a) E F(v(a)). In other
words, given any a sufficiently small, there is a v(a) E S(a) such that with
Ql(v(a)) and Qz(v(a)) as defined in (5.1) and (5.3), respectively, and with q(a) -
v(a)
Q~(v(a)) ,~(a) is an a- proper solution. As a goea to zero, since v(a)
Qz(v(a))
and hence also p~(v(a)) and (iz(v(a)) are bounded, it follows that there is a
subsequence {a„} for which v(a„) converges to a limit v' and (31(v(a„)) and
21v'
3Z(v(a~) converge to some Q~ and ~i2, respectively. Let p' - ~~ . Let w(rt' )-
~2
q f Mrt'. Since For 1 G i G k, w;(p(a)) ~ 0-~ v;(a) C a, it follows that
w;(rl') ~ 0-~ rl; - 0, b i- 1,2...k. Thus (w(q'),p') is a solution to the
LCP(q, M) which is proper. Moreover, for smal! enough a, v(a) is an a-proper
Nash equilibrium and v" itself is a proper Nash equilibrium to the game.
REMARK 5.1 Theorem 5.2 can also be stated and proved in a similar manner
for a polymatrix game ~see ~2~ and ~.{~ for a discussion on polymatnx gamesJ.
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